10. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam an The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. no isolated event. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? . The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. 4. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. McNamara was ready to respond. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. . One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. Operation Fast and Furious 10 The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. He also requested air support. The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. $22. 9/11. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. It is not NSA's intention to prove or Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two . It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. Here's why he couldn't walk away. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. the Gulf of Tonkin The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. Media Manipulation. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. 2, pp. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. The Navys seaborne SIGINT effort in support of OPLAN-34, called Desoto Missions, played a key role in the events that ultimately led to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. Conspiracy In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. Conspiracy Gulf Of Tonkin Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. National Security Agency His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in Badly damaged, the boat limped home. Vaccines. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." Subscribe now and never hit a limit. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. Hickman, Kennedy. The NSA report is revealing. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). 10. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. 136-137. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Hickman, Kennedy. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. "11 McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. 426-436. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. IV-2 to IV-4. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. How the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Embroiled the US in the Vietnam The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. 3. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis.